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THE DIVIDED PROPERTY INTERESTS IN
CONDITIONAL SALES
L. VOLD

A conditional sale, as the term is used in current installment
sales of chattels, usually appears in the form of a contract to sell
when the buyer completes payment of all installments of the
purchase price, the buyer getting the possession and the use of
the goods in the meantime, and the seller having the power under
the contract to retake the goods in the event of the buyer's default.
Is the legal effect of such a transaction merely that of a contract
to sell, with the property interest in the goods to pass in the future
when the stipulated conditions of payment or other performance
have been complied with; or is the transaction, on the contrary,
a present transfer of the property interest subject to encumbrance
in favor of the seller, as a practical form of security for payment
of the purchase price?
If the transaction is examined in the light of the ordinary
tests for determining the intention of the parties, it is clear that
all the elements of a present sale are present. The goods are
specific. The parties have agreed to all the terms of the bargain.
Even delivery has been made. Nothing remains to be done by
the seller, and the buyer need only make payment as provided in
the contract. The parties to the bargain thus have clearly supplied all the ordinary indications that they intend to transfer the
ownership in the property at once.
What, then, do the parties mean by the express term in the
agreement that the title is not to be transferred until the installments have all been paid in full? Where the parties have by the
other terms of their bargain and by their conduct thereunder
manifested the intention that the property was to pass at once, and
have also in express terms said that it was not to pass until payment of the last installment, what actually is the intention?
(713)
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While it is often difficult for the parties to-express their intentions in sufficiently precise and articulate terms to indicate without
question their exact legal effects,' it is clear in the ordinary case
that the parties intended that there should be divided property
interests in the goods, the buyer to have the incidents of ownership
but the seller to have security in the goods for the price. Expressed loosely and familiarly, a conditional seller might say that
the goods belong technically to him but practically to the buyer.
Viewed from a slightly different angle, the conditional seller is
likely to say that he has an interest in the goods to the extent of
the outstanding balance of the price, admitting that the buyer also
has an interest in the goods to the extent of the excess over the
outstanding balance. Buyers, similarly, in such cases speak of
the goods as their own and treat them as their own, recognizing
meanwhile that the seller also has an interest in the goods, but
usually they are unable to express in precise terms the exact extent
of that interest. This feature is especially accentuated in the case
of automobiles bought on installments, where title is reserved in
the sellers until paid and yet it is understood and expected by all
parties to the bargain that the buyers shall be regularly registered
in the public records under the motor vehicle laws as the owners
of the automobiles. Reference to "the buyer's equity in the goods"
is a form of expression often used informally to indicate the
realities of the transaction which has been couched in the technical language of a conditional sale contract reserving title in the
seller until paid in full. Viewed merely as a business proposition,
it is very clear that the ordinary conditional sale contract, by which
an enormous volume of current installment sales is handled, is
'It must be admitted that the difficulty is not all traceable to unfamiliarity
with the precise application of legal terms. Part of the difficulty is also
traceable to the desire on the part of the sellers, carried into elaborately
drawn contracts through the services of attorneys secured for the purpose,
to express the contract in fictitious forms in order to evade certain legal
restrictions or to express the contract in such ambiguous form as to permit
the seller to claim either as seller or as owner depending on which may in
the particular events turn out to be more to his advantage. See Heryford v.
Davis, 102 U. S. 235, 244 (188o); National Cash Register Co. v. Paul, 213
Mich. 6og, 616, 182 N. W. 44, 46 (1921); Wood v. Cox, 92 N. J. Eq. 307,
309, 113

At].

501, 502 (1921).
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intended to result in divided property interests, the general interest of ownership and beneficial use passing to the buyer on delivery, subject to a security interest, under whatever name expressed,
reserved in the seller, as security for the purchase price. While
there are still various conflicting theories prevalent in different
jurisdictions as to the nature of conditional sales, and there is
still much confusion in the language employed in the cases 2 in
describing the relations between parties to conditional sales, direct
recognition of the fact that conditional sales involve divided property interests in the goods is now very frequently found in the opin2 Many of the earlier cases seem to have regarded the contract language
reserving title in the seller until payment as conclusive that the transaction
was merely a contract to sell. See cases referred to in Harkness v. Russell,
Naturally, this language, emphasizing
118 U. S. 663, 7 Sup. Ct. 51 (1886).
merely that clause in the contract, is often repeated even in recent cases. Babbitt & Cowden Live Stock Co. v. Hooker, 28 Ariz. 263, 236 Pac. 722 (1925);
Holmes v. Schnedler, 176 Minn. 483, 223 N. W. 9o8 (1929).
Under the rule in force in Colorado a reservation of title in the seller
under a conditional sale contract amounts to a secret lien which is valid between the parties but which is void as against parties without notice. Turnbull v. Cole, infra note 77.
A somewhat similar view prevailed in Illinois .for many years. Gilbert v.
In 1915 the
National Cash Register Co., 176 Ill. 288, 52 N. E. 22 (1898).
rule was changed to accord with the weight of authority through the operation of sections 20 and 23 of the Uniform Sales Act. Graver Bartlett Nash
Co. v. Krans, 239 Ill. App. 522 (1925). For some critical comments by Professor George G. Bogert on this change of front in Illinois, see infra note 78.
In Kentucky the conditional sale contract is given the same legal effect
as a sale with a chattel mortgage back. Montenegro-Riehm Music Co. v.
Beuris, i6o Ky. 557, 169 S. W. 986 (1914).
Under the Louisiana rule it is held that the sale is absolute, the reservation of property in the seller being regarded as void for repugnancy. Barber
Asphalt Paving Co. v. St. Louis Cypress Co., 121 La. 153, 46 So. 193 (19o8).
In Michigan an unsatisfactory distinction is maintained between an absolute reservation of title till payment, which is called a conditional sale, and
a contract whereby the seller purports to reserve the title by way of security
merely, which is said to amount to a chattel mortgage. Atkinson v. Japink,
186 Mich. 335, 152 N. W. IO79 (1915).
Under the language commonly used in Pennsylvania before that state
adopted the' Uniform Conditional Sales Act there was a great similarity between bailment contracts and conditional sale contracts elsewhere. Schmidt
v. Brady, 284 Pa. 4r, 13o Atl. 259 (1925); see Mueller, Conditional Sales in
Pennsylvania Slice the Sales Act (1924) U. OF PA. L. REV. 123.
In the staie ofWashington it is declared, contra to the weight of aut-rity, that the conditional buyer acquires no property interest, legal or equitable,
until payment. Holt M.fg. Co. v. Jaussaud, infra note 28. Despite such language it is recognized in Washington that the conditional buyer enjoys many
of the incidents of ownership in the goods.
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ions of courts.3 Various statutes now also directly or indirectly
show recognition of this fact.4
The legal nature of the conditional sale transaction may be
briefly summarized in the statement that it is a present transfer
of the beneficial ownership in the goods to the buyer, with an
accompanying reservation of the legal title in the seller as security
for the purchase price.5 Under a conditional sale, therefore, each
party has certain property interests in the goods, less than complete and absolute ownership. 6 Expressed in precise Hohfeldian
terms, each has less than complete ownership, but each has with
'Bailey v. Baker Ice Machine Co., 239 U. S. 268, 36 Sup. Ct. 50 (1915)
(the buyer's right to perform the conditions and acquire the ownership is a
property right); Murray v. McDonald, 203 Iowa 418, 212 N. W. 711 (1927)
(a species of double ownership in buyer and seller, the ownership of each
subject to the interest of the other) ; Worcester Morris Plan Co. v. Mader, 236
Mass. 435, 128 N. E. 777 (1920) (conditional buyer has a special property
in the goods); Welch v. Harnett, 127 Misc. 221, 215 N. Y. Supp. 540 (1926)
(conditional buyer is equitable owner, and is for all practical purposes the
owner). That conditional buyer has an equity, see Brown v. Woody, 98 W.
Va. 512, 127 S. E. 325 (1925); Underwood v. Raleigh Transportation, etc.
Co., lO2 W. Va. 3o5, 135 S. E. 4 (1926).
Referring to the seller's interest
as a lien, see Van Derveer & Son Co. v. Canzono, 206 App. Div. 130, 200

N. Y. Supp. 563 (923); Biederman v. Edson & Co., 128 Misc. 455, 219
N. Y. Supp. 115 (1926); Hawley v. Levy, 99 W. Va. 335, 128 S. E. 735
(925); Mlodzik v. Ackerman Oil Co., 191 Wis. 233, 212 N. W. 790 (1926).
' Local statutes affecting conditional sales are set out in 2 U. L. A. Some
of these bear out the statement in the text, but no attempt can here be made
to analyze those statutes. The Uniform Sales Act, it may be noted, is so
drawn as to recognize this distinction, § 22 (a) providing that where the property is reserved by the seller merely to secure performance by the buyer the
goods are at the buyer's risk from the time of delivery.
The Uniform Conditional Sales Act, in §§2 and 3, goes a great deal
farther in recognizing the fact of divided property interests in conditional sales,
adopting a form of statement under which the rights of the buyer and the
rights of the seller are segregated and separately dealt with. The Uniform
Conditional Sales Act, unfortunately, has as yet been adopted only in a few
jurisdictions: Alaska, Arizona, Delaware, New Jersey, New York, Pennsylvania, South Dakota, West Virginia and Wisconsin.
Proceedings under various statutes to forfeit automobiles used in illegal
transportation of liquor have incidentally brought out very sharply that both
buyers and sellers under conditional sales have property interests in the goods
forfeited.

U. S. v. One Ford Coupe, 272 U. S. 321, 47 Sup. Ct. 154 (1926) ;

White Auto Co. v. Collins, 136 Ark. 8I, 2o6 S. W. 748 (1918) (provision that
interest of seller be forfeited regardless of his innocence) ; People v. One
Buick Coupe, 71 Cal. App. 6o, 236 Pac. 198 (1925) (protecting innocent
seller's interest). As to the effect of the National Prohibition Act, 41 STAT.
305 (ig19), 27 U. S. C. § 26 (1926), see Commercial Credit Co. v. U. S., 276
U. S. 226, 48 Sup. Ct. 20 (1928).
'".

.

. the incidents of beneficial ownership are with the conditional
BOGERT, COMMN-

buyer, and the seller's reserved title is for security merely."
TARIES ON CONDITIONAL SALES (1924) § 29, 2A U. L. A.
'WILLISTON,
SALES (2d ed. 1924) § 330.

§ 29.
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relation to these goods certain rights, powers, privileges, and
immunities. 7 The exact scope of these rights, powers, privileges
and immunities can vary greatly among individual cases, as they
are determined largely by the provisions of the particular contract
and the extent of the buyer's performance thereunder, but are
also affected by certain rules of law and especially by the provisions
of local recording acts.
THE CONDITIONAL BUYER'S INTEREST IN THE GOODS
That the buyer in a conditional sale has a property interest
in the goods, as distinguished from having only a contract claim
against the seller, is manifested in various ways. The buyer has,
in the first place, the right to possession and beneficial use of the
goods. The buyer in possession, if the goods are wrongfully
taken or injured by strangers, has the ordinary possessory remedies
to recover the possession or to obtain compensation for injury to
the goods.8

Without default by the buyer in the payment of

installments, the goods cannot rightfully be taken from the buyer,
even by the conditional seller, who in express terms has reserved
title in himself. 9 In case of default, the common law cases usually
permit the seller to retake the goods, sometimes with qualifications
'HoHFELD,

'The

FUNDAMENTAL

LEGAL CONCEPTIONS

(1923)

53, 54.

conditional buyer in possession when the goods are injured through
negligent acts of third parties may recover damages from the wrongdoer.
Smith v. Louisville & N. R. R., 2o8 Ala. 440, 94 So. 489 (1922); Brown v.
New Haven Taxicab Co., 92 Conn. 252, 102 Atl. 573 (1917); Downey v.
Bay State St. Ry., 225 Mass. 281, 114 N. E. 2o7 (1916) ; Carter v. Black
& White Cab Co., lO2 Misc. 68o, 169 N. Y. Supp. 441'(i9iS). The conditional buyer has a cause of action for conversion against third parties
who wrongfully take the goods from his possession. Harrington v. King,
121 Mass. 269 (1876); Angell v. Lewistown State Bank, 72 Mont. 345, 232
Pac. 90 (1925). Action by the conditional seller against a third party wrongdoer for injury to the goods is barred by the conditional buyer's previous
settlement out of court with the wrongdoer where nothing is shown to impeach the settlement. Ellis Motor Co. v. Hancock, 38 Ga. App. 788, 145 S. E.
518 (1928) ; Smith v. Gufford, 36 Fla. 481, IS So. 717 (895).
On the conditional buyer's recovery of damages from the wrongdoer, he must account
to the conditional seller to the extent of the conditional seller's interest. Lacey
v. Great Northern Ry. Co., 70 Mont. 346, 225 Pac. 8o3 (1924); Harris v.
Seaboard Air Line Ry., 19o N. C. 480, 130 S. E. 319 (1925).
'Carvell v. Weaver, 54 Cal. App. 734, 202 Pac. 897 (1921); Besche v.
Brady, I39 Md. 582, 116 Atl. 63 (I92i) ; Commercial Credit Corp. v. Miron, io8
Conn. 524, 143 Atl. 846 (1928) (replevin); Madison River Live Stock Co. v.
Osler, 39 Mont. 244, 1o2 Pac. 325 (1909) (replevin) ; cf. National Cash Register
Co. v. Richards, 159 Mich. 128, 123 N. W. 587 (i9o9).
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that are somewhat obscure. 10 It is clearly recognized in the
Uniform Conditional Sales Act that, apart from a proper retaking
by the seller for the buyer's default, which is in effect only foreclosure, the buyer's possession cannot rightfully be interfered
with." The conditional buyer of an automobile, in order to have
the benefit of its use on the public highways during the period
while installments of the price are still outstanding, is recognized
as entitled to have it registered in his name as "owner" under
motor vehicle laws requiring the car to be registered in the owner's
name.

12

The conditional buyei also has the power to become the absolute owner irrespective of any subsequent assent on the part of
the seller by paying the price or otherwise performing the conditions of the contract. On the buyer's performance according
to the terms of the contract he is recognized as absolute owner.' 3
The same consequence is held to follow a proper tender even after
default if before actual retaking by the seller, even though the
seller should decline to accept it.' 4 Whether this is described by
saying that title then Dasses automatically to the buyer, 15 or
whether it is said that the seller's security interest is then extinguished, thereby leaving the buyer's ownership in the goods unencumbered, it is plain that the conditional buyer, even before complete performance, enjoys a power to make himself complete owner
which is independent of the conditional seller's subsequent assent.
10

See infra p. 724;

U

UNIFORM CONDITIONAL SALES

BOGERT,

op. cit. supra note 5, § 19, and authorities cited.
Acr, § 25; Underwood v. Raleigh Trans.,

etc. Co., supra note 3.
'"Brown v. New Haven Taxicab Co.; Downey v. Bay State St. Ry., both
supra note 8; cf. Temple v. Middlesex & Boston St. Ry., 241 Mass. 124, 134
N. E. 641 (922).
In certain states this position is expressly provided for
in recent amendments to the local motor vehicle laws. N. Y. HIGHWAY LAW
(1927) § 282-e; R. I. Pub. Laws 1927, c. 1040, § 3.
' Staunton v. Smith, 6 Pen. 193, 65 At. 593 (Del. 19o6) ; Tufts v. Griffin,
107 N. C. 47 (I89O).

"4Wilkinson v. Fisherman's & Canner's Supply Co., 57 Cal. App. 165,
2o6 Pac. 761 (1922) ; White Co. v. Union Transfer Co., 270 Pa. 514, 113 AtI.
432 (1921) ; Duplex Printing Press Co. v. Public Opinion Publishing Co., 41
S. D. 523, 171 N. W. 6o6 (1919). In Tweedie v. Clark, 114 App. Div. 296,

90 N. Y. Supp. 856 (igo6) the same result was reached under the local statute, even after the seller had resumed possession of the horse sold, the buyer's
tender having been made before the necessary foreclosure sale.
' White Co. v. Union Transfer Co., supra note 14; Kiefer-Haessler Hardware Co. v. Paulus, 149 Wis. 453, 135 N. W. 832 (1912).
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The conditional buyer may also before performance transfer 16 or encumber 17 his interest, even though- there are special
restrictions in the contract to the contrary, his transferees thereby
becoming entitled to keep the goods by making or tendering full
performance to the conditional seller."' Where there are in the
contract no special restritions upon transfers by the conditional
buyer, his transferees succeed a fortiori to iis rights and powers
with reference to the property, 19 subject, apart from recording
acts, to their performing the obligations to which the original
conditional buyer himself was bound. 20 The conditional buyer's
interest in the goods may not only be transferred in his lifetime,
but may pass in succession 2 1 or, it would seem, be disposed of
by will. It is well recognized that the conditional buyer has an
insurable interest in the property. 22 It is also well established
by a large array of well reasoned cases, codified now in the Uniform Conditional Sales Act,23 despite some conflict on the point

as a common law matter,2 4 that warranties are imposed in favor
of the buyer in conditional sales on the same basis as in sales
which are in the first instance absolute. The chance of gain
through increase in the value of the goods is with the buyer. 2 5
"Fairbanks, Morse & Co. v. Parker, 167 Ark. 654, 269 S. W. 42 (1925);
Karalis v. Agnew, III Minn. 522, 127 N. W. 44o (Igio).
7 Cable Co. v. McElhoe, 58 Ind. App. 637, io8 N. E. 790 (1915) ; Dame
v. Hanson & Co., 212 Mass. 124, 98 N. E. 589 (1912).

"Clinton v. Ross, io8 Ark. 442, 159 S. W. 1103

(1912);

Davies-Overland

Co. v. Blenkiron, 71 Cal. App. 69o, 236 Pac. 179 (1925).
v. Telhiard, 123 Miss. 1i1, 85 So. I34 (I92O); Tweedie
"Oppenheimer
v. Clark, mupra note 14.
"Liver v. Mills, 155 Cal. 459, 101 Pac. 299 (i9o9) ; Hoe v. Rex Mfg.
Co., 205 Mass. 214, 91 N. E. 154 (I9IO).
t
Mathushek & Son Piano Co. v. Weld, 94 Misc. 282, I58 N. Y. Supp. 169
(1916); Dold Packing Co. v. Potter Title & T. Co., 79 Pa. Super. 112 (1922).
'Sturgeon v. Hanover Fire Ins. Co., 112 Kan. 206, 210 Pac. 342 (1922) ;
Baker v. Northern Assur. Co., 214 Mich. 540, 183 N. W. 6I (1921); Vigliotti
v. Home Insurance Co., 206 App. Div. 398, 201 N. Y. Supp. 407 (923).
"3UNIFORM CONDITIONAL SALEs Acr, § 2.
2 See BoGExr, op. cit. supra note 5, § 31 ; ESTRICH, INSTALLMENT SALES

(1926) §§ 264-268.
*'In Frank v. Batten, 49 Hun gi, I N. Y. Supp. 705 (1888) there was a
conditional sale of lumber to be manufactured into finishing woodwork. In
such cases the seller gets the accession with the original chattel, though
somewhat changed in form, on retaking for the buyer's default, but the seller's
interest can be discharged, as in other cases, by the buyer's paying or tendering the balance due.
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If the chattels conditionally bought are living animals their natural
increase during the period of the contract belongs to the buyer
on the same conditions as the original animals.2 6 The buyer also
has an equity of redemption after default.
Taking all these
various features together, it is very clear that the conditional
buyer enjoys most of the beneficial incidents of ownership in
the goods.
Not only does the buyer have most of the beneficial incidents
of ownership in goods bought under conditional sale contracts,
but he also has the ordinary burdens of ownership. Thus, the
conditional buyer is almost everywhere held to bear the risk of

loss. 28

Whether the goods are lost through their destruction by
3 1 or death,3 2
30
accidental fire,2 9 or through theft, deterioration,

the buyer's liability to the conditional seller for the entire purchase
price remains unaffected. In this respect, the results conform
exactly to the principle that the loss follows the beneficial ownership. Even though it be freely recognized that there is an alternative ground on which the cases often place the formal explanation
of the buyer's bearing the risk of loss, in that by the terms of the
33
contract he has promised absolutely to pay the purchase price,
'Anderson

v. Leverette, 116 Ga. 732, 42 S. E. 1026 (1902); UNIFORM
SALES Act, § 27.
UNIFORM CONDITIONAL SALES ACT, § I8. See Jenkins v. Blackstone

CONDITIONAL
,

Motor Co., Inc., 216 App. Div. 583, 587, 215 N. Y. Supp. 694, 698 (1926).
State statutes to the same effect are cited in 2 U. L. A. § I8. Apart from statutes, the conditional buyer has the power after default but before repossession to extinguish the seller's interest by a proper payment or tender. See
cases cited supra note 14. After the conditional seller has retaken the goods
on the buyer's default, the buyer's right to redeem is, apart from statute, in
great confusion. See cases cited infra notes 59, 59; BOGERT, op. cit. supra
note 5, § 115; EsTRlcn, op. cit. suora note 24, §§ 441-443.
2s UNIFORM SALES ACT, § 22 (a);

UNIFORM CONDITIONAL SALES AcT, § 27.

Contra: Holt Mfg. Co. v. Jaussaud, i32 Wash. 667, 233 Pac. 35
'O'Neill-Adams

(925).

Co. v. Eklund, 89 Conn. 232, 03 Atl. 524 (915);

Peer-

224

N. W.

less Bread Machine Co. v. Matthews, 8I Pa. Super. 329 (1923).
Solberg v. Minneapolis Willys-Knight Co., i77 Minn. 10,
271 (1929) ; Vigliotti v. Home Insurance Co., supra note 22.

' Constantin v. Lippincott, 93 Misc. 72, i56 N. Y. Supp. 550 (1915).

'Collerd v. Tully, 78 N. J. Eq. 557, 8o AtI. 49I (Ig).
'O'Neill-Adams Co. v. Eklund, supra note 29; Constantin v. Lippincott,
supra note 3. Despite the language of the cases, reference to the well established doctrine of mutual dependency of promises in bilateral contracts suggests that the real reason for the conditional buyer's carrying the risk of loss
is not that his promise to pay was absolute but that he is the beneficial owner
of the goods. WILLISTOk, CONTRACrS (1920) C. XXVI.
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the substantial result remains that the burden of the risk of loss
falls on the buyer. The conditional buyer, who enjoys most of
the beneficial incidents of ownership, thus also carries the risk
of loss, which is the most conspicuous burden of ownership. Other
incidental burdens of ownership also fall upon the buyer. Thus,
the buyer's interest in the goods may be reached by his creditors.3 4
Taxes on the goods under ordinary statutes requiring assessment
to the owner are assessed properly to the buyer. 5 In the case
of conditional sales of automobiles, the buyer, as the party who is
to have the possession and use of the car, is also usually the party
who must comply with the requirements of registration and pay
6
the fees therefor under the motor vehicle laws.
Since the conditional buyer, therefore, not only enjoys most
of the usual beneficial incidents of ownership but also carries the
usual burdens incident to ownership of the goods, he is properly
described as the beneficial owner whose interest in the goods is
qualified only by the conditional seller's security interest. This
qualification of the conditional buyer's interest in the goods may
in the individual case be of greater or less importance, depending
on the extent of the conditional seller's interest. The extent of
this interest, in turn, depends largely on the terms of the contract
and the amount of the balance outstanding, but is also affected
by local rules of law and local recording acts.
THE CONDITIONAL SELLER'S INTEREST IN THE GOODS

That the conditional seller's interest in the goods is limited
to an interest held as security for the purchase price is readily
apparent when the term "security" is used in a broad inclusive
sense, whether the transaction be viewed informally as a business
proposition or whether it be viewed legally with reference to the
terms of the contract, the conduct of the parties, and the circumstances of the case.
"Peek v. Heim, 127 Pa. 5oo, 17 At. 984 (i889). Contra: Whitney v.
Biggs, 92 Misc. 424, 156 N. Y. Supp. iioT (I915). The Uniform Conditional
Sales Act makes no express provision regarding the rights of creditors of the

buyer. However, see BoGERT, op. cit. supra note 5, at 36.
State v. White Furniture Co., 2o6 Ala. 575, go So. 896 (192i).
' See Welch v. Hartnett, supra note 3.
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Viewed informally in its practical business aspects it is plain
that the conditional sale transaction is resorted to by the parties
as a device for financing the purchase of goods on credit by a
buyer generally without adequate means for full payment on delivery. The parties manitestly intend that the buyer shall get
control of the goods at once, that he shall in due time pay the
agreed purchase price, and that the seller shall not interfere with
the buyer's control of the goods except in case of his default under
the contract. At the same time it is very clear that the conditional
seller under ordinary circumstances does not want the goods back
but wants the purchase price paid, that the intention of the parties
is that the price shall be paid, and that the conditional buyer is
bound to pay that price and has no option of discharging the
contract by a return of the goods. Using the term "security" in
a broad sense, the conditional seller's interest in the goods is merely
security for the purchase price in a transaction in which the seller
for the time being is carrying unusually heavy risks in extending
credit to the buyer.
That the conditional seller holds only a limited interest in
the goods for the purpose of security for the purchase price is
also readily apparent when the transaction is examined in its legal
aspects. Despite very sweeping language employed in certain
clauses of conditional sale contracts purporting in terms to reserve
in the seller the entire property interest in the goods, the results
attained in the decided cases show that the seller's interest is much
more limited.
Before default by the conditional buyer, the conditional
seller's interest in the goods, however described, obviously does
not exclude the buyer's interest, which, as indicated above, extends
to most of the ordinary incidents of ownership. Even before the
buyer's default, however, the conditional seller has some of the
beneficial incidents of ownership in the goods. Thus, the conditional seller has an insurable interest in the goods to the extent
of his security. 37 The conditional seller may recover damages
from wrongdoers at least up to the extent of his interest when
' Commercial Credit Co. v. Eisenhour, 28 Ariz. 112, 236 Pac. 126 (1925);
Aetna Ins. Co. v. Heidelberg, 112 Miss. 46, 72 So. 852 (1916).
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they convert or do damage to the goods. 88 Before the buyer's
default the conditional seller also has some-though not all-of
the ordinary burdens of ownership. Thus, his interest in the goods
may be reached by his creditors. s9 His interest may also be taxed
as a secured credit, 40 although the full value of the goods cannot
be assessed to him as owner.4 1 He is not, however, subject as
42
owner to the risk of destruction or loss of the goods.
The limited character of the conditional seller's interest in
the goods is apparent with reference to its assignment. The conditional seller has the power to transfer his interest in the goods
by making an assignment of his claim for the purchase price.43
As in more familiar instances of secured claims, the debt of the
conditional buyer is here the principal thing, the seller's interest
in the goods being its security. By the assignment the assignee
succeeds to the position of the assignor, the original conditional
seller. 44 The assignment by the conditional seller is subject to
equities available between the original parties to the bargain.
Thus, where there is fraud on the seller's part in the original
bargain the seller's assignee takes the security subject to the conditional buyer's power to set up the original seller's fraud.45 If
there be no notice to the conditional buyer of the fact of assignment, subsequent payment to the assignor, the original conditional
- Ryals v. Seaboard Air Line Ry. Co., 158 Ga. 303, 123 S. E. 12 (1924);
Lacey v. Great Northern Ry. Co., supra note 8.
'Escobar v. Rogers, 182 Cal. 603, I89 Pac. 268 (i92o); McMillan v.
Lamed, 41 Mich. 521, 2 N. W. 662 (i879).
'Stillman v. Lynch, 56 Utah 540, 192 Pac. 272 (i92o).
'State v. White Furniture Co., supra note 35.
" UNIFORM CONDmONAL SALEs Acr, § 27; UNIFORM SALES Acr, § 22 (a).
As to the conflict under the common law, see WLSToN, SALEs (2d ed. 1924)
§ 304.
"Western States Securities Co. v. Mosher, 28 Ariz. 420, 237 Pac. 192
1925) ; General Motors Acceptance Corp. v. Smith, ioi N. J. L. 154, 127
tl i79 (i925). The assignment of the secured debt may be made in automobile cases without complying with the formalities required for proper
transfer of the automobiles under the ordinary provisions of motor vehicle
laws. General Motors Acceptance Corp. v. Smith, supra.
"Western States Securities Co. v. Mosher; General Motors Acceptance
Corporation v. Smith, both supra note 43. That the conditional seller's transferring the note for the price does not prejudice holder's rights under contract
of conditional sale, see McMullen Machinery Co. v. Grand Rapids Trust Co.,
239 Mich. 295, 214 N. W. 110 (927).

Contra: Winton Motor Carriage Co.

v. Broadway Auto Co., 65 Wash. 65o, i8 Pac. 817 (19i); cf. State Bank
v. Johnson, 104 Wash. 550, 177 Pac. 340 (igx8).

"Auto Brokerage Co. v. Ullrich. io2 N. J. L. 341, 134 Atl. 885 (1926).
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seller, will discharge the debt and extinguish thereby the conditional vendor's interest.461 Similarly, subsequent modifications
of the contract by the original parties, if entered into by the
buyer without notice of the prior assignment, are binding upon
the assignee. 47 Before default, therefore, it is apparent that the
conditional seller's interest in the goods is a limited interest. This
interest can be described, using the term broadly, as an interest
held as security for the purchase price.
After the conditional buyer's default, the conditional seller's
powers are greatly enlarged in that he can now retake the goods
from the buyer. Carefully drawn conditional sales contracts
usually provide in express terms that in the event of the buyer's
default the seller may retake the goods, but the same result is
reached even without such clause, by interpretation of the general
clause reserving the property in the seller until the buyer has
performed all his obligations under the contract. 48 The conditional seller, on the default, may exercise his power to retake
the goods by the mere act of resuming possession, 49 if he can do
so without otherwise committing a trespass 50 or provoking a
breach of the peace.5 1 If private retaking is resisted or is for
any other reason considered inconvenient, the conditional seller
may have resort to legal process. Thus, he may recover possession
of the goods in an action of replevin.5 2 If the buyer retakes
the goods from a seller who has rightfully repossessed them, his
act constitutes a conversion for which the seller may recover in
Stella v. Bankers Commercial Corp., 197 App. Div. 515, z89 N. Y. Supp.
511 (1921).
7

, Hare & Chase v. Volansky, 127 Misc. 26, 215 N. Y. Supp. i68 (1926).

' Ryan v. Wayson, io8 Mich. 519, 66 N. W. 370 (1896); Richardson
Drug Co. v. Teasdall, 52 Neb. 698, 72 N. W. 1o28 (1897); Federal Sales Co.
v. Kiefer, 273 Pa. 42, 116 At. 545 (1922).
"lUNIFORM CONDITIONAL SAI.ES ACr, § 16; Bankston v. Hill, 134 Miss.
288, 98 So. 689 (1924); Grossman v. Weiss, 129 Misc. 234, 221 N. Y. Supp.
266 (927); Lynch v. Sable-Oberteuffer-Peterson, 122 Ore. 597, 260 Pac. 222
(1927) ; see Starr v. Govatos, 13o Atl. 392 (Del. I925).
'Donomick v. Rea, 226 Mich. 594, 198 N. W. 184 (1924); Stewart v.
North Co., 65 Pa. Super. 195 (1g6).
' Silverstin v. Kohler & Chase, 18i Cal. 51, 183 Pac. 451 (1919); Driver

v. State, 116 Neb. 666, 218 N. W. 588 (1928);
AcT, § I6.
' Schmoller & Mueller Piano Co. v. Smith,
(927); Grossman v. Weiss, supra note 49.
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a tort action.ea If the seller unjustifiably retakes the goods from
the buyer, on the other hand, he is himself liable- for conversion."
LEGAL EFFECTS OF THE EXERCISE OF THE SELLER'S- REMEDIES
What are the legal effects of the seller's retaking the goods
when the conditional buyer defaults? This question has many
complex applications, on the numerous details of which there is a
great deal of very sharp conflict of authority. Much of this conflict is traceable fundamentally to divergent analyses by different
courts of the nature of conditional sales. Only a few of the
principal applications can be here mentioned.
Many courts have in effect taken the position that the seller's
retaking is a rescission of the contract for the buyer's default. 55
This position would seem to be unsound, for if retaking were held
to constitute rescission for default, the result would follow that
the seller would be bound to restore the payments made by the
buyer on account in order to put both parties back in their original
positions.5" The retaking may be held, on the contrary, to be
the exercise of one of the powers conferred on the seller by the
contract, and therefore not a rescission of the contract for the
buyer's default, but the enforcement of the term of the contract
The retaking thus being
providing for the event of default. 1
have held that under
courts
many
the
contract,
terms
of
the
under
those terms the buyer is not entitled to the return of any payments
made on account. 58 To avoid the extreme hardship and apparent
Studebaker Bros. Co. of Utah v. Witcher, 44 Nev. 442, 195 Pac. 334

(1921).
"Reinkey v. Findley Elec. Co., 147 Minn. i61, i8o N. W. 236 (i92o);
Richardson v. Great Western Motors, iog Wash. 324, 187 Pac. 333 (920).
"Star Drilling Machine Co. v. Richards, 272 Pa. 383, 1i6 AtI. 309
(1922) ; see BOGERT, op. cit. supra note 5, at 17o, and cases there cited. Statutes
dealing with the matter are also occasionally drawn on the theory that retaking constitutes rescission. Urquhart v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 207 Mo. App.
627, 227 S. W. 881 (i921).
"Rayfield v. Van Meter, 120 Cal. 416, 52 Pac. 666 (1898); Hays v. Jordan & Co., 85 Ga. 741, 1i S. E. 833 (189o).
17Dodge v. Carter, 140 Cal. 663, 74 Pac. 292 (1903) ; Schmoller & Mueller
Piano Co. v. Smith, sup'ra note 52; Interstate Ice & Power Corp. v. U. S.
Fire Ins. Co., 243 N. Y. 95, 152 N. E. 476 (1926).
SRayfield v. Van Meter, supra note 56; Schmoller & Mueller Piano Co.
v. Smith. supra note 52; Raymond Co. v. Kahn, 124 Minn. 426, 145 N. W.
164 (1914).
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injustice of a forfeiture of the conditional buyer's interest where
he has paid all but the last installment or two, even though the
terms of the contract so provide, some courts now require, either
under the authority of special statutes enacted for the purpose
or under some application of the common law analogy of chattel
mortgages, that the conditional buyer shall have some opportunity
to redeem the goods after the retaking,59 and that if they are not
redeemed the seller shall resell them and apply their proceeds to
the balance due and account to the buyer for any excess that may
be available. 60
When the buyer's payments on account have not been sufficient to equal the depreciation in the value of the goods, there is
a somewhat similar conflict of opinion among the courts over the
question whether the seller after retaking is entitled to recover any
deficiency from the buyer. Many courts, conceiving that retaking
the goods either constitutes rescission of the contract or gives
rise to failure of consideration under the contract, have held
that after a retaking the seller can no longer sue the buyer on
the contract. Accordingly, a retaking of the goods is held to be
inconsistent with an action for a deficiency.6 1 Such reasoning
is founded on the misconception that the conditional sale transaction constitutes only an executory contract, overlooking the fact
that the beneficial interest in the goods passes to the buyer at the
outset and that the seller's power of retaking for default is therefore only a summary form of foreclosure of his security interest.
Other courts, better guided through some application of the common law analogy of chattel mortgages, or because of the fortunate
assistance of local statutory enactments pointing in that direction,
or specific provisions in recent contracts to that effect, or a combination of these considerations, have held that after retaking
the goods and applying the proceeds to the balance due the con' Van Derveer & Son v. Canzono, supra note 3; Puffer & Sons Mfg.
Co. v. Lucas, 112 N. C. 377, 17 S. E. 174 (1893); UNIFORM CONDITIONAL SALES
AcT, § I8. Contra: Penchoff v. Heller & Co., 176 Minn. 493, 223 N. W. 9gi
(1929).

iW
BOGERT, op. cit. supra note 5, at 159 et seq. This position is codified
in the Uniform Conditional Sales Act, §§ 1g, 21, when the buyer has paid
at least fifty per cent. of the contract price.
a Aultman & Co. v. Olson, 43 Minn. 409, 45 N. W. 852 (i8go) ; Star Drilling Machine Co. v. Richards, supra note 55.
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ditional seller is still entitled to enforce the contract against the
buyer for the payment of any deficiency.6 2 Both in the matter of
accounting for excess and in the matter of recovery for deficiency
the Uniform Conditional Sales Act follows largely the analogy
of chattel mortgages. 3
If the conditional seller sues for the purchase price, instead
of retaking the goods on the buyer's default, there is a similar
conflict of authority regarding the effect of such action on the
right to retake. Many courts have held that an action for the
price is inconsistent with subsequent retaking of the goods, 4 the
result being that by suing for the price the conditional seller is
held to waive the power to retake the goods. The reasoning
on which this conclusion is based is difficult to follow and seems
utterly unsound. It seems to be assumed in such cases, contrary
to the realities, that the conditional sale transaction is merely an
executory contract, and to that is then apparently added the further
assumption that by bringing his action for the price the conditional seller waives his reserved title, thereby making the buyer
the owner, as it is said that on no other basis can he be entitled to
recover the entire purchase price. Other courts, better appreciating the realities in the conditional sale transaction as constituting
a transfer to the buyer of the beneficial interest in the goods with
large powers reserved to the seller for the purpose of securing the
purchase price, have held that there is no inconsistency between
an action for the price and subsequent resort to the security in the
form of retaking the goods where payment of the price has not
been forthcoming through the action. 5 This position, following
Matteson v. Equitable Mining, etc., Co., 143 Cal. 436, 77 Pac. 144 (1904) ;
Bedard v. Ransom, 241 Mass. 74, 134 N. E. 392 (1922); Interstate Ice &
Power Corp. v. U. S. Fire Ins. Co., supra note 57; First National Bank v.
Yocum, 96 Ore. 438, 189 Pac. 220 (1920).
" UNIFORM CONDITIONAL SALEs AcT, §§ 18-21, 23, 24;

Central Acceptance

Corp. v. Frye, IO3 W. Va. 689, 138 S. E. 369 (1927) ; Commercial Investment
Trust, Inc. v. Wesling, 220 N. W. 855 (S. D. 1928).
"'Bailey v. Hervey, 135 Mass. 172 (1883); cf. Haynes v. Temple, i98
See BOGERT, op. cit. supra note 5, at 175
Mass. 372, 84 N. E. 467 (i9o8).
et seq.
6'Murray v. McDonald, 203 Iowa 418, 212 N. W. 77 (1927); Ratchford
v. Cayuga County, etc., Co., 217 N. Y. 565, 112 N. E. 447 (1916). However,
it is usually regarded as a conclusive election of remedies by the seller if he
effectively asserts a lien on the goods or levies on them an attachment or
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in substance the analogy of chattel mortgages, is also adopted in
the Uniform Conditional Sales Act. 66
RELATIONS WITH THRD PARTIES

The foregoing analysis of the interests in the goods held by
the conditional buyer and the conditional seller respectively broadly
indicates that which each may transfer to other parties by voluntary sale and that which may be taken from each by his creditors.
According to the general common law rules of property one may
ordinarily transfer that which he has but no more, and one's
creditors may ordinarily take by appropriate legal process that
which their debtor has but no more. These elementary rules are
as applicable to the divided property interests involved in conditional sales as they are to the more familiar undivided property
interest of complete and absolute ownership of goods. Here, as
in other cases, the application of these rules may be modified in
certain respects because of statutory changes, because of circumstances of estoppel or of authorization, or because of certain
special rules of policy.
Applying the familiar rule that one cannot convey more
than he has, it is held by the overwhelming weight of authority,
in cases in which recording acts do not apply, that a transfer by
the conditional buyer to a third party, even though it be to a party
who is a purchaser for value without notice, does not cut off the
original conditional seller's interest. 7 The few jurisdictions that
have held to the contrary are themselves not in accord as to the
reasons for their conclusions. Similarly, a transfer by the conditional seller while the buyer is in possession without default
operates at most as a transfer merely of the seller's claim for the
68
purchase money with his reserved security interest in the goods.
execution as the buyer's goods.

Beirce v. Hutchins, 205 U. S. 340, 27 Sup. Ct.

524 (io7); New England Road Machinery Co. v. Vanderhoof, 1g F. (2d)
331 (C. C. A. ist, 1927). It is submitted that since in conditional sales the
seller and the buyer have divided property interests in the same goods, no
taking o.f the buyer's interest under attachment or levy need be regarded necessarily as a waiver of the seller's security interest.
'UNIFORM

CONDITIONAL SALEs AcT, §24.
2; WILUISToN, SALES (2d ed. 1924)

'Harkness v. Russell, supra note
§ 324.
"See supra notes 43-47.
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Subsequent mortgagees or other encumbrancers for value from the
conditional buyer stand in this respect like purchasers, succeeding
to the limited interest of their respective transferors.69 Attaching or execution creditors, similarly, apart from powers derived
from recording acts, can rightfully seize only the interest of their
debtor in the goods. Accordingly, the conditional buyer's creditors
70
acquire by a levy on the goods no greater interest than he had.
Similarly, where creditors of the conditional seller by appropriate process reach his interest they are subject to the buyer's
interest 71 under the contract and cannot justify a seizure of possession of the goods from the buyer without his default. 2 On the
same basis, an assignee in insolvency or a receiver of an insolvent
conditional buyer, acting for the benefit of the creditors, takes
the goods subject to the conditional seller's interest.73 The same
is usually true of the conditional buyer's trustee in bankruptcy 74
unless his position in the case in hand is affected by recording
75
acts.
FILING OR RECORDING ACTS

The effect of filing or recording statutes in the case of conditional sales is largely analogous to the effect of recording statutes
in the more familiar case of chattel mortgages. Statutes providing for the recording of chattel mortgages quite generally
embrace two vital features. In the first place, provision is made
for recording such mortgages in some ascertained public office
' Federal Commercial & Savings Bank v. International Clay Machinery
Co., 230 Mich. 33, 203 N. W. I66 (1925); Racine-Sattley Co. v. Meinen, 79
Neb. 33, 114 N. W. 6o2 (i9o7).
o Contractor's Equipment Co. v. Reasner, 242 Mich. 589, 219 N. W. 713
(1928) ; Finance Corp. of America v. McGhee, 142 S. C. 38o, 140 S. E. 69i
(1927).
Under the common law rules of distress, however, the conditional
buyer's lessor taking under distress prevails against the conditional seller, who
occupies at best no stronger position than absolute owners of other goods found
on the premises. In re Brittingham Candy Mfg. Co., i F. (2d) 489 (D. C.
D. Del. 1924).
'Escobar v. Rogers, supra note 39.
nBickerstaff v. Doub, i Cal. xog (1861).
Praeger v. Emerson-Brantingham Implement Co., 122 Md. 3o3, 89 Atl.
501 (1914); Gresham Mfg. Co. v. Carthage Buggy Co., I52 N. C. 633, 68
S. E. 175 (I91o).
7 Bailey v. Baker Ice Machine Co., supra note 3.
"See infra note 82.
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where those who have occasion to do so may examine them and
thus get notice of the facts. In the second place, provision is
made that unless the mortgage is properly recorded it shall be void
as against certain classes of parties having dealings with the
moitgagor without notice thereof. Thus, it is most frequently
enacted that, unless recorded, the chattel mortgage shall be void
as against innocent purchasers of the goods from the mortgagor.
Similar provision making the unrecorded chattel mortgage void
as against certain types of creditors, such as judgment or attaching
creditors, is also very common. The effect of these provisions is
so far to change the common law rule of caveat emptor as to
confer on the chattel mortgagor a power to cut off the interest of
the chattel mortgagee under an unrecorded mortgage, a power
which can be exercised by making a sale of the mortgaged goods
to an innocent purchaser. A somewhat similar power is conferred on the mortgagor's creditors, usually exercisable by securing
a lien on the goods. Recording acts thus give parties dealing
with the mortgagor in possession a large measure of protection
against secret liens in the form of unrecorded prior chattel mortgages. At the same time recording acts guard the important field
of mortgage credit from serious interference through providing
the mortgagee with an opportunity to record his mortgage in the
designated public office where it will be open to inspection by all
interested parties, the recording serving to affect outside parties
with constructive notice.
In conditional sale transactions, the problem of hardship on
parties dealing with the conditional buyer in possession, because
of the secret reserved interest of the conditional seller, is very
similar to that which is so familiar in connection with chattel
mortgages. As has beer previously noted, parties dealing with
the conditional buyer, whether as purchasers of the goods or as
creditors advancing accommodation on the credit of those goods,
can under the ordinary common law rules succeed only to the
limited interest of the conditional buyer. To avoid the resulting
hardship on parties dealing with the conditional buyer without
knowledge of the conditional seller's reserved security interest,
the bold construction has sometimes been put on conditional sale
transactions that they are chattel mortgages in substance and that
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in consequence the chattel mortgage statutes apply to them. 76 In
certain states, on the other hand, it has been held that conditional
sales, involving secret liens in favor of the conditional seller, are
constructively fraudulent and void as against parties without
notice. 77 Obviously this view greatly impairs the range of conditional sale credit that can be practicably extended to purchasers
in those states. 78 In a large majority of states at the present
time the problem of the secret lien in favor of the conditional
seller is met by statutes somewhat analogous to chattel mortgage
recording acts requiring the filing or recording of conditional
sale contracts.7 9 Since the conditional sale recording acts that are
now in force in the various states vary greatly in detail, the local
statutes must be carefully examined in dealing with actual cases.
Most of these statutes in effect give the conditional buyer the
power to cut off the conditional seller's interest under an unrecorded conditional sale by making in turn a sale to an innocent
purchaser.80 To a greater or less extent they also give creditors
of the conditional buyer the power to secure priority over the
conditional seller by making a levy on the goods or acquiring a
8
judgment lien before notice of the unrecorded conditional sale. '
Under the operation of the amendment of 1910 to the National
Bankruptcy Act, the conditional buyer's trustee in bankruptcy
acquires the status of a lien creditor under the conditional sale
recording acts to the exclusion of the conditional seller whose
contract is not recorded. 8 2 An ordinary equity receiver of an
insolvent conditional buyer, not being in position to invoke the
" Hudson Co. v. Apartment Investment Corp., 244 Mich.

529, 221

N. W.

630 (1928).

' 7Turnbull v. Cole, 70 Colo. 364, 20 Pac. 887 (i9zi).
"See note (1926) 20 ILL L. REV. 708, by Professor Bogert.

WILLISTON, SALES (2d ed. 1924) § 327.
, Holley v. Haile Motor Co., 188 App. Div. 798, 177 N. Y. Supp. 429
(1919) ; Anchor Concrete Machinery Co. v. Pennsylvania Brick & Tile Co.,
292 Pa. 86, 14o Atl. 766 (1928).
On the other hand, a conditional seller who has assigned his interest cannot make an effective sale of the property when repossessed which will cut
off the original assignee's interest. State Bank of Black Diamond v. Johnson,
104 Wash. 550, 177 Pac. 340 (1918).
I Cashman v. Lewis, 26 Ariz. 95, 222 Pac. 411 (1924) ; Brown v. Christian,
97 N. J. L. 56, 117 Ad. 294 (1922).
In re Bradbury Co., 8 F. (2d) 496 (E. D. N. Y. 1925) ; cf. In re Gelatt
& Son, 24 F. (2d) 215 (M. D. Pa. 1928).
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bankruptcy statute in his favor, stands merely as successor to the
conditional buyer and is therefore subject to the conditional
seller's interest even though the conditional sale contract is not
recorded.8 s' General creditors of the conditional buyer ordinarily do not under conditional sale recording acts get priority
over the conditional seller whose contract is not -recorded."4
Though the conditional sale contract is not filed promptly at the
time of the transaction, the conditional seller can protect his
interest by filing his contract as required at any time before innocent purchasers or lien creditors have intervened.5 Purchasers
from the conditional buyer with notice of the facts cannot under
the usual conditional sale recording acts obtain priority over the
conditional seller even though his contract is not recorded.86 The
same is true of attaching or execution creditors with notice,8 7 and
the same has been held for the conditional buyer's trustee in bankruptcy where there was from the outset notice of the conditional
sale. 8
CONDITIONAL SALES FOR RESALE-APPARENT AUTHORITY

Conditional sale transactions are often resorted to not only
for financing sales to ultimate users who have not sufficient means
to pay on delivery but also for financing sales to retailers who

similarly are without sufficient means to pay the wholesaler or
manufacturer on delivery. As in other cases of conditional sales
the terms of such contracts are binding upon the parties them-

selves.8 9

It is clear in such cases, however, that when the retailer

makes a sale to an innocent purchaser in the ordinary course of
'Quinn

v. Bancroft-Jones Corporation, 18 F. (2d) 727 (C. C. A. 2d,

1927) ; Delaware Trust Co. v. Elder, 12 Del. Ch. 263, 112 Atl. 370 (1920);

Koerner v. U. S. Waxed & Coated Paper Co., 94 N. J. Eq. 655, 121 Atl. 338
(1923); cf. Ward v. Southern Sand & Gravel Co., 33 F.

(2d)

773 (M. D.

N. C. 1929).
' BoimT, op. cit. supra note 5, § 59.
Bailey v. Baker Ice Machine Co., supra note 3.
8 See cases cited in ESTRICH, op. cit. supra note 24, § i99, n. io, and in
BOGERT, op. cit. supra note 5, at 8o.
'Biederman v. Edson & Co., Inc., supra note 3; Lyle Culvert & Road
Equipment Co. v. Anderson Lumber Co., 46 S. D. 366, 193 N. W. 58 (1923).
'In re Golden Cruller & Doughnut Co., Inc., 6 F. (2d) 1015 (D. N. J.
1925).
' BOGERT, op. cit. supra note 5, § 79.
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business the entire property interest in the goods passes to such
purchaser free and clear of the original conditional seller's security
interest. Such cases fall within the range either of apparent or
actual authority, and the conditional seller is therefore bound on
the ordinary rules of agencyY0 It is to be noticed, further, that
conditional sale recording acts ordinarily do not affect the question, as between the original conditional seller and innocent purchasers from the retailer in the ordinary course of business, the
retailer's actual or apparent authority to resell being decisive to
protect the purchaser in such cases against the original conditional
seller even though the conditional sale contract be recorded,'
Where the resale by the retailer is not in the ordinary course of
business, however, the original conditional seller's interest remains
unaffected and can be enforced against the purchaser even though
he had no notice, the appearance of authority to sell in the ordinary course of business not justifying reliance thereon when sales
are made out of the usual course. 92
Where contests arise between the original conditional seller
and creditors of the retailer, the conditional seller usually prevails
unless the creditors are within the protection accorded by recording
acts, the creditors otherwise succeeding merely to the rights of
their debtor.9 3 The actual or apparent authority to resell does
not apply to justify an otherwise improper taking of the original
conditional seller's interest by the retailer's creditors.94 There
are, to be sure, some cases that have held the other way on the
broad ground that by allowing the retailer to place the goods in
his stock for sale the original conditional seller has helped to
create an appearance of ownership in the retailer conducive to
'°Kearby

v. Western States Security Co., 31 Ariz.

104, 250

Pac. 766

Mass. 313, 23 N. E. 839 (x8go) ; Finance
Corporation v. Jones, 97 N. J. L. io6, I6 Atl. 277 (1922), aff'd, 98 N. J. L.
165, iig Atl. II (1922); Clark v. Flynn, 120 Misc. 474, igg N. Y. Supp. 583
(1926) ; Spooner v. Cummings, I5

(1923).

' Kearby v. Western States Security Co.; Finance Corporation v. Jones,
both supra note go; UNmFoRm CoNDITAioNA SALES ACT, § 9.
'-Andre v. Murray, 179 Ind. 576, Ioi N. E. 8i (1913); Burbank v.
Crooker, 73 Mass. 158 (1856).
IThorne v. Webster, 193 Wis. 97, 213 N. W. 646 (927).

"Mishawaka Woolen Mfg. Co. v. Stanton, 188 Mich. 237, 154 N. W. 48

(1915).
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his obtaining a false credit.95 Such cases seem very questionable.
However convincing such reasoning may be on these facts to
justify protection of a purchaser from the retailer by the application of the doctrine of ostensible or apparent authority to sell,
it seems much less convincing to justify protection'to the retailer's
creditors, aside from recording acts, by the application of a corresponding doctrine of ostensible ownership as a basis for credit. It
is so well known in the business world that goods are often delivered to retailers for sale by them as factors or commission merchants, or on other special arrangements without the retailer's
becoming a purchaser on his own account, that his possession of
goods even with apparent authority to sell hardly seems without
more a sufficient appearance of ownership to justify reliance on
such ownership as a satisfactory basis for extension of credit.
Troublesome questions regarding the proper application of
the doctrine of ostensible or apparent authority may arise in connection with conditional sale transactions apart from the cases
of conditional sales to retailers for resale. It is clear by the
overwhelming weight of authority that mere delivery of possession
by the conditional seller to the conditional buyer does not, apart
from the operation of recording statutes, confer upon the conditional buyer apparent authority to dispose of the conditional
seller's interest.9
Therefore, conditional buyer's delivery of
the goods to a dealer in second-hand goods of that kind, the conditional seller having no knowledge of the facts, confers no apparent authority on such dealer to cut off the conditional seller's
interest by making a resale to a purchaser.97 To the same effect
it has been held, where the conditional seller has assigned his interest, that a subsequent repossession by the original conditional
seller without the assignee's knowledge or consent confers no
apparent authority on him to cut off the assignee's interest by
making a resale.9 8 On the other hand, where such assignee auWagon Co. v. Poole, 235 Fed. 817 (C. C. A. 6th, I916).
'Sherer-Gillett Co. v. Long, 318 Ill. 432, 149 N. E. 225 (1925).
Rudolph v. Farmer's Supply Co., 131 Va. 305, io8 S. E. 638 (I921).
"State Bank of Black Diamond v. Johnson, supra note 8o; cf. Gump Invest'Mitchell

ment Co. v. Jackson, 142 Va. 19o, 128 S. E. 5o6 (1925); Halliwell v. TransStates Finance Corp., 98 N. J. L. 133, i18 Atl. 837 (1922).
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thorizes or permits repossession by the original conditional seller,
a finding of apparent authority to resell is upheld, thereby protecting the subsequent innocent purchaser, even though the resale
was in violation of certain restrictions prescribed by the original
At least one case
seller's assignee holding the security interest.
has applied the doctrine of apparent authority to protect innocent
purchasers from the buyer where the conditional seller had permitted the conditional buyer to remain in possession long after
default. 10 0 It has also been intimated that apparent authority
might, perhaps, be made out on showing that the conditional
seller attached to the chattels name plates bearing the buyer's
name. 101 In the field of conditional sales, as in other applications
of the doctrine, the limits of apparent authority do not readily
lend themselves to precise definition in legal terms but rather
depend largely on how the facts in cases that arise are understood
and interpreted in everyday affairs by those who are familiar with
their practical details.10 2
0

Truck, Tractor & Forwarding Co. v. Baker, 281 Pa. 145, x26 Aft. 239

(924).
' Dayton Scale Co. v. General .Market House Co., 248 Ill. App. 279 (929).
'Anchor Concrete Machinery Co. v. Pennsylvania Brick & Tile Co.,
supra note 8o.
"See note (1927) 47 A. L. R. 85.

